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Abstract
The vulnerability of finger vein recognition to spoofing
attacks has emerged as a crucial security problem in the
recent years mainly due to the high security applications
where biometric technology is used. Recent works shown
that finger vein biometrics is vulnerable to spoofing attacks,
pointing out the importance to investigate counter-measures
against this type of fraudulent actions. The goal of the 1st
Competition on Counter Measures to Finger Vein Spoof-
ing Attacks is to challenge researchers to create counter-
measures that can detect printed attacks effectively. The
submitted approaches are evaluated on the Spoofing-Attack
Finger Vein Database and the achieved results are pre-
sented in this paper.
1. Introduction
Biometrics is a growing up technology whose interest is
related to the large number of applications where a correct
assessment of identity is a crucial point. However, biomet-
ric systems are vulnerable to attacks which could decrease
their level of security [15]. A recent problem that is ques-
tioning the application of biometrics when high security is
required are the direct attacks, where the sensor is attacked
using synthetic biometric samples without specific knowl-
edge about the system. Also referred to as spoofing attacks
or presentation attacks, these are performed when an invalid
user tries to gain access to the system by presenting a copy
of the biometric traits of a valid user. Among all biometric
technologies, finger vein recognition is a fairly new topic,
which utilizes the vein patterns inside a person’s finger.
This technology is relatively recent with first commercial
applications in 2005 by Hitachi Ltd [11]. Nowadays this is
widely used in the financial sector in Japan, China, Poland
or Turkey, and it is claimed to be accurate [1, 8] although
there is a debate in the scientific community [12, 18].
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The fact that the vein pattern used for identification is
embodied inside the finger prevents the data to be easily
stolen, contrary to face that can be captured with a cam-
era or fingerprints that can be collected from latent prints.
However, acquiring images of finger vein patterns is not im-
possible. To the best of our knowledge the first attempt to
spoof finger vein was conducted by Matsumoto et al.1. But,
it was until years later, when a spoofing attack that could
successfully by-pass a finger vein recognition system for a
different number of identities was demonstrated [17].
The proposed challenge is the first attempt to bench-
mark finger vein anti-spoofing algorithms. For this reason,
there is no existing state-of-the-art on spoofing finger vein
counter-measures. Concerning the face anti-spoofing sys-
tems, which can likely be extrapolated to finger vein sys-
tems, they can be categorized in three broad categories with
respect to the cues they use to detect the spoofing attack [2].
i) The texture-based methods explore the texture artifacts
and the quality deterioration that appear when an image is
recaptured. ii) The motion-based methods explore the un-
natural movements on the scene in the case of spoofing at-
tacks, while iii) the liveness-based methods try to detect
any evidence of liveness or signs of vitality on the scene as
an indicator of the presence of a real person. Due to the
kind of spoofing images (printed finger vein images) pro-
vided by this Competition, only the texture-based methods
make sense. Future attacks that will use more sophisticated
techniques such as video from finger vein will open the op-
portunity to study motion or liveness-based approaches, as
for example, the movements of adjustment or the blood flow
of the fingers.
Unique finger vein spoofing counter-measures have been
proposed by 4 teams participating in this Competition. In
this paper they are thoroughly explained and their spoof-
ing detection capabilities are compared using the Spoofing-
Attack Finger Vein database. The teams’ details are pro-
vided in Table 1. Note that author list and teams’ name and
1http://www.gbd-e.org/events/2007/summit2007/
presentation/14_Yokohama.pdf
Team Institution
Baseline Reference system publicly available providedby Idiap Research Institute, Switzerland
GUC Norwegian Biometric Laboratory,Gjøvik University College, Norway
B-Lab Biometrics and Biomedical Analytics Group,University of Surrey, United Kingdom
GRIP-PRIAMUS University Federico II of Naples, Italy
Table 1. Participating teams’ and institutions.
description are sorted by strict order of registration.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
a short description of the Spoofing-Attack finger vein
database follows in Section 2. Each team’s finger vein
spoofing counter-measure is described in Section 3. The
evaluation criterion summarized in Section 4, followed by
a report on its performance and a comparative analysis in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 reports the conclusions.
2. Spoofing-Attack Finger Vein Database
The Spoofing-Attack finger vein database2 [17] consists
of 440 index finger vein images of both real-access and
attacks attempt to 110 different identities. This database
was produced at the Idiap Research Institute in Martigny, in
Switzerland and all images (real-access and attacks) were
recorded using the same open finger vein sensor.
The total number of images in the database is 880 (240
in the training set, 240 in the development set and 400 in the
test set.) It is important to highlight that clients that appear
in one of the data sets (train, dev or test) do not appear in
any other set. The training set (“train”) was used for training
the anti-spoof classifier, the development set (“dev”) was
used for the threshold estimation, and finally, the test set
(“test”) was used to report the final performance. In the
course of the competition, the participants had access to all
the protocol sets of the data. However in the test stage, they
received an anonymized test set that consists of a random
mixing of the original test set images.
The goal of the attack protocols is to evaluate the (binary
classification) performance of counter-measures to spoof
attacks. Hence, the competition were split into 2 differ-
ent sub-tasks according to the visual information available:
full printed images and cropped images. This classification
scheme makes-up a total of two protocols that can be used
for studying the performance of counter-measures to finger
vein attacks. Both full and cropped protocols are designed
to use prior information based on trained classifiers or non
trained approaches where the decision is taken based just on
the input. The format of the images is a bitmap image saved
as png format. The resolution of the full images is 665×250
pixels, the cropped images is 565× 150 pixels, and size of
the files is around 80 kbytes per image.
2https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/fvspoofingattack
This is the first database on spoofing finger vein and
presents several advantages. Firstly, the database has a well-
defined protocol consisting of training, development and
test sets. For fair and unbiased algorithm evaluation, it is
recommended that the training set is used to train counter-
measures such as computing background models, PCA and
LDA projection, etc; development set to estimate specific
parameters to maximize the performance, e.g., optimising
the decision threshold and fine-tuning hyperparameters of a
classifier; and, the test set should be solely used to report
results. Secondly, the database provides a separate set of
enrolment images, which can be used to train and evaluate
a finger vein recognition system. Such an approach is of
high importance, as it enables one to assess how effective
the attacks are in deceiving a finger vein recognition system
and whether an anti-spoofing scheme is necessary in that
setup. As claimed by [17], more than 80% of the attacks in
this database successfully by-pass a finger vein system.
3. Anti-spoofing Approaches Submitted
3.1. Baseline System
The baseline anti-spoofing system proposed is a texture-
based algorithm that exploits subtle changes in the finger
vein images due to printed effects using the frequency do-
main. To recognize the static texture, the Fourier Transfor-
mation (FT) is extracted from the raw image after applying
an histogram equalization. Once the FT is calculated and
normalized on logarithmic scale, a window of 20 pixels cen-
tred vertically on the center of the image is applied to extract
the average vertical energy of the FT. Then, the bandwidth
of this average vertical signal (Bwv) at a cut-off frequency
of −3 dB is calculated. The final score to discriminate be-
tween real-accesses and spoofing attacks is this bandwidth
normalized by the height of the image (h), i.e. s = Bwv/h,
resulting a score normalized in the range [0− 1].
This method exploits the idea of the bandwidth of ver-
tical energy signal on real finger vein images, which is
weakly manifested on spoofing finger vein samples. The
main reason of it is that the recaptured spoofing finger vein
samples displays a smooth texture with changes mainly
vertical, changes translated as a horizontal energy in the
Fourier domain. On the other hand, real finger vein images
have better focus and sharpness on both horizontal and ver-
tical directions, displaying both directions of energy in their
Fourier transform. It is interesting to note that this approach
does not need any kind of training or classifier to work.
The proposed algorithm is easily reproducible because
the source code, programmed using free signal processing
and machine learning toolbox Bob3, is freely available4.
3http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob
4Code available at: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/
antispoofing.fvcompetition_icb2015
3.2. GUC Team
The team adopts a texture-based approach by extracting
binarized statistical image features (BSIF), applied directly
to the finger vein images without preprocessing in both full
and cropped protocols.
The idea of the BSIF is to represent each pixel as a binary
code obtained by computing its response to a filter that are
learned using the statistical properties of the natural images.
They have employed the open-source filters free available
at [10] that are learned using 50, 000 image patterns ran-
domly sampled from 13 different natural images [9]. The
learning process to construct these statistically independent
filters involves three main steps: (1) mean subtraction of
each patches, (2) dimensionality reduction using Principle
Component Analysis (PCA), and (3) estimation of statisti-
cally independent filters (or basis) using Independent Com-
ponent Analysis (ICA).
Thus, given finger vein sample Ifv(m,n) and a filter Fi
of same size then, filter response is obtained as follows [10]:
ri =
∑
m,n
Ifv(m,n)Fi(m,n), (1)
where m and n denotes the size of the finger vein image and
Fi, ∀i = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the number of linear filters
whose response can be computed together and binarized to
obtain the binary string as follows [10]:
bi =
{
1, if ri > 0
0, otherwise
(2)
Finally, the BSIF features are obtained as the histogram
of pixel’s binary codes that can effectively characterize the
micro-texture components in the finger vein sample. The
BSIF are extracted using three different scales and bits: i)
3 × 3 with 8 bits, ii) 5 × 5 with 9 bits, and iii) 7 × 7 with
12 bits, which generate three independent feature sets with
different dimensions: 1× 256, 1× 512, and 1× 4096.
The three final feature vectors are fed into separate linear
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers. The obtained
scores for the three approaches are then normalized by the
min-max normalization and combined using the sum fusion
rule.
The proposed approach takes approximately 2 sec per
image for training and less than 1 second per image for clas-
sification using an Intel i7 processor - 8Gb RAM PC with
Matlab software and Windows 7.
3.3. B-Lab Team
The team takes the advantage of monogenic scale space
based global descriptors. The main motivation behind
monogenic scale space based global descriptors is that lo-
cal object appearance and shape within an image can be de-
scribed by the distribution of local energy and local orienta-
tion information. The implementation of the descriptors can
be achieved either by dividing an image into small blocks
and for each block, one computes the histogram of energy
at each orientation for the pixels within the block. This is a
local approach. Alternatively, one can compute a histogram
representing the whole image as a single block, leading to a
global approach. The latter approach is used here in order
to reduce the computational complexity.
The proposed global descriptor is well suited for anti-
spoofing as it captures the local energy and local orienta-
tion at coarse level; therefore it can differentiate between
the actual vein block and the spoofed vein block.
The monogenic signal is a representation derived from
a generalization of the 1-D Hilbert transform to a higher
dimensional signal space [5] and [19]. A generalization is
made possible by building upon the first order Riesz trans-
form [16]. This strategy is advantageous because it can rep-
resent an image in terms of the local phase, local orienta-
tion, and local energy.
Given an image, the monogenic scale space first com-
putes the local energy and local orientation at three differ-
ent scales. For each of the three scales, a pixel (at a given
scale) is represented by two values: energy and orientation.
The orientation is divided into 36 equally spaced bins. A
weighted histogram is subsequently derived by accumulat-
ing the energy associated with each of the orientation bins
of the image at a given scale. Since this process is repeated
for each of the three scales, this results in 108 dimensions.
Finally, the classifier used to discriminate between real
accesses and spoofing attacks is support vector machine
(SVM) with a histogram intersection kernel trained with a
near boundary coefficient value of 0.001. The method takes
less than one tenth of a millisecond for classification using a
Dell PowerEdge 6850 Intel -8- CPU/16-Core - 32GB RAM
PC with Matlab software and Ubuntu 12.
3.4. GRIP-PRIAMUS Team
The team explores an approach based on the use of local
descriptors, which are powerful tools to describe the sta-
tistical behaviour observed locally in small patches of the
image. In particular, they selected the Local Binary Pat-
tern (LBP) [13], which were successfully used for different
tasks, like texture and face recognition. The team proposed
two different approaches to handle cropped and full images.
For cropped images in order to improve the discrimina-
tion ability of LBP and better explore the image statistics,
the descriptor is extracted on a high-pass version of the im-
age with 3 × 3 integer kernel [7]. In particular, a 3 × 3
neighbourhood of the target pixel x shown below:
⎡
⎣ x0 x1 x2x7 x x3
x6 x5 x4
⎤
⎦
where the residual r is computed as:
r = x− 1
2
∑
i odd
xi +
1
4
∑
i even
xi.
To avoid fractional coefficients, all quantities were multi-
plied by 4. Note that, while LBP encodes first-order spa-
tial variations computed on two-pixel supports, the use of a
preliminary high-pass filters amounts to considering higher-
order statistics computed on a larger support. LBP is then
evaluated on the residual image r by considering 8 neigh-
bours sampled uniformly on a circle of radius 1. The result-
ing vector is formed by 256 features.
For full images indeed they used the concatenation of
Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) [14] and Weber Local De-
scriptor (WLD) [3]. LPQ uses a binary encoding scheme
similar to LBP, but the patch surrounding the target pixel is
analyzed in the Fourier domain. In particular, it uses the lo-
cal phase information computed by means of the Short Time
Fourier Transform (STFT) over a patch: four complex-
valued coefficients at selected frequencies are extracted and
binary quantized to form an 8-bit feature. Also in this case a
histogram is generated and used as a 256-dimensional fea-
ture vector. WLD, instead, encodes two types of informa-
tion in the spatial domain: i) the differential excitation and
ii) the local orientation. Since these two descriptors extract
information on the patch in different domains they comple-
ment one another and can give better results in terms of dis-
crimination ability [6]. The resulting combined vector is
formed by 1, 216 features. Finally, for both the approaches
the team used a support vector machine (SVM) with linear
kernel as classifier.
The LBP approach on full images takes about 15 seconds
for training and about 1e−7 seconds to compute the classi-
fication of one sample. The second approach feature level
fusion of LPQ+WLD takes around 900 seconds for feature
extraction and about 5e−6 seconds for classification of a test
image. These times were calculated using a 2.2 GHz Intel
Core i7 - 6 Gb RAM PC with Matlab software and Win7.
4. Evaluation Criterion
The ranking of the participating anti-spoofing algorithms
is based on Half Total Error Rate (HTER). It is defined
as a mean of False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False
Rejection Rate (FRR). In the case of anti-spoofing, FAR
refers to the ratio of spoofing attacks which are not cor-
rectly detected, while FRR refers to the ratio of real ac-
cesses which are incorrectly classified as spoofing attacks.
The HTER is measured on the anonymized test set us-
ing a threshold calculated a priori on the development set,
which has calculated individually from the score files in
each full and cropped protocol. The threshold is chosen
using the Equal Error Rate (EER) criterion, which is the
value equalizing FAR and FRR. The smallest the HTER
on the test set, the higher rank the anti-spoofing counter-
measure will get. Additionally, the metric d′ for “decid-
ability” or decision-making power [4] has been calculated:
d′ = |μ1 − μ2|/
√
1
2 (σ
2
1 + σ
2
2). This d′ is defined as the
separation between the means (μ1 and μ2) of the two distri-
butions (real-accesses and spoofing attacks), divided by the
square-root of their average variance (σ21 and σ22), reflecting
the intrinsic separability of the two distributions.
5. Discussion and Results
The algorithms proposed in this competition approach
the problem from different aspects, as listed in Table ??.
The analysis of the textural differences is the most popular
approach adopted by all the teams due to the definition of
the challenge. It is also very interesting to notice the use
of the support vector machine as classifier by all the teams,
opposite to the baseline system that does not use any kind
of classification.
A common approach for many teams is combining sev-
eral different concepts together. In particular, the fusion
is performed either at feature-level or score-level. GRIP-
PRIAMUS team performs feature-level fusion on different
categories of features (information in the spacial domain
and texture descriptor), while GUC team adopt a score-
level fusion using the sum fusion of the outputs of the three
SVMs, which classified three different BSIF features from
three different scales and bits.
Figure 1 and Table 2 summarize the performance of the
proposed algorithms. The performance figures are given for
both development and anonymized test set. The algorithms
are trained and evaluated considering two different types of
attacks (full and cropped) in the Spoofing-Attack finger vein
database.
Considering the results on the test set, both full and
cropped protocols have to be analysed separately. On the
full, two teams and the baseline system have achieved per-
fect discrimination between the real accesses and the spoof-
ing attacks of the database: B-Lab and GRIP-PRIAMUS.
All teams have achieved perfect separability of the two
classes on the development set, but still, not all algorithms
got to generalize as well the anonymized test set. It is inter-
esting to notice that the submitted algorithms have not lead
better results than the baseline system proposed.
On the other hand, the baseline system outperforming
the worst results on the cropped protocol. The winning
algorithm was the ones proposed by the GRIP-PRIAMUS
team that extract the texture information using the LBP fea-
tures. The rest of the algorithms which achieved very low
HTER also combine several texture approaches together:
GUC team fuses at score-level different features classified
by SVMs, while B-Lab team combines different global de-
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Figure 1. SCORE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR REAL-ACCESS AND SPOOFING ATTACKS. Performance results for the proposed anti-spoofing
algorithms. The vertical dashed line stands the decision threshold.
Team Protocol Development TestFAR FRR HTER d’ FAR FRR HTER d’
Baseline
Full
0.00 0.00 0.00 9.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.17
GUC 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.46 0.00 8.00 4.00 4.47
B-Lab 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.06
GRIP-PRIAMUS 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.03
Baseline
Cropped
4.17 40.83 22.50 1.58 11.00 30.00 20.50 1.82
GUC 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.09 1.50 4.00 2.75 3.81
B-Lab 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.68 0.00 2.50 1.25 5.54
GRIP-PRIAMUS 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.20
Table 2. Performance results for the proposed anti-spoofing algorithms (in%). The measure d′ stands the decidability.
scriptors such as the local energy and the local orientation.
Among the algorithms submitted, it is important to stand the
universal application of the algorithms submitted by these
two teams GUC and B-Lab, which manage to achieve low
HTER in both protocols.
Comparing the results, the baseline algorithm which rely
only on a single cue is the most successful approach in dis-
criminating real accesses and spoofing attacks in the spe-
cific full protocol. But considering the diversity of attacks
in finger vein systems, it seems that an approach relying
on a single cue is not able to detect all types of attacks, as
demonstrated the cropped protocol results. Different types
and different qualities of spoofing attacks need to be tackled
in a different way, but simple methods can be very useful on
the raw image of the finger vein recognition systems.
One of the goals of the competition was to support repro-
ducible research by encouraging the participants to provide
the source code of their algorithms as a free software. This
will allow easy reproduction of results and a reliable refer-
ence for comparison with future anti-spoofing algorithms.
All teams responded positively to this invitation.
6. Conclusion
Given the increasing use of the biometric technology in
highly secured applications, such as in the finance sector,
it is crucial to safeguard biometric systems against various
attacks, including spoof.
The growing use of the biometric technology in sectors
such as the financial one, whose interest is related to the
large number of high security applications, makes the as-
sessment of vulnerabilities a challenging crucial point of
study. For this reason, spoofing attacks are drawing more
and more attention from the scientific community.
In this context, finger vein modality is a biometric trait
widely used in this financial sector in countries such as
Japan, China, Poland or Turkey, but yet; ironically, there
is no study on how easily the modality can be spoofed.
This is possibly due to the difficulty in stealing, because
it is embodied inside the finger and a infrared illumination
is needed to extract it.
The recent works that proved a successful spoofing at-
tack to a finger vein recognition system has inspired a
competition to challenge researchers to develop the first
spoofing counter-measures able to detect printed finger vein
spoofing attacks. In particular, this paper presents the first
competition on counter measures to finger vein spoofing at-
tacks, starting with naive spoofing attacks created by print-
ing a finger vein image on a paper. All 4 participating teams
have developed highly sophisticated methods, approaching
the problem from different aspects, mainly related on the
analysis of the texture of the finger vein images. For ex-
ample, GRIP-PRIAMUS team performed feature-level fu-
sion on different categories of features (information in the
spacial domain and texture descriptor), while GUC team
adopted a score-level fusion using the sum fusion of the
outputs of the three SVMs, which classified three differ-
ent BSIF features from three different scales and bits. The
B-Lab team combined different global descriptors such as
the local energy and the local orientation, while finally, the
baseline system exploited the differences between real ac-
cesses and spoofing attacks in the Fourier domain without
any kind of classification.
Several participating teams achieve impressive results
in detecting spoofing attacks in the Spoofing-Attack finger
vein database. The results demonstrate that one of the best
strategies for finger vein spoofing attacks is the texture anal-
ysis of the full image. Such an approach seems to be effec-
tive in tackling printed spoofing attacks. As the quality and
sophistication of spoofing attacks is expected to increase in
the future, this observation gives indication on the direc-
tions for future research in finger vein anti-spoofing. One
of the main objectives for future work should be assem-
bling a database with even more realistic spoofing attacks,
for example video-based finger vein, temperature sensing,
detection of blood flow on the fingers or 3D fingers.
This work presents two important limitations, first the
vascular patterns need to be extracted from a sensor, we as-
sumed that users are cooperative in providing them. And
second, the feedback given by the finger vein sensor used
is important in order to perform the spoofing attack. Com-
mercial systems are a blackbox but using an open device,
the needed feedback to attack these systems can be obtained
and therefore improve the countermeasures.
Therefore, given the novel ideas, the achieved results
and the drawn conclusions, the 1st Competition on Counter
Measures to Finger Vein Spoofing Attacks has achieved the
goal to consolidate a set of state-of-the-art of finger vein
spoofing counter-measures against printed attacks.
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